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RETAINING JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE:               
SOLUTIONS TO INCREASING 






While the judicial merit system in Alaska has effectively balanced 
accountability with the competing need for independence in the judiciary, the 
growing trend of politicized retention elections threatens that independence. 
This Note examines the threat to the Alaskan judicial merit system, argues for 
the importance of protecting an independent judiciary, and proposes a number 
of potential solutions to reform or replace the current retention election system. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, Alaska’s judicial retention election resulted in an outcome 
unprecedented in the state’s history: voters rejected a judge who had been 
recommended for retention by the Judicial Council.1 While a number of 
factors likely contributed to this outcome,2 the most significant was that 
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 1.  Daniella Rivera, Preliminary Numbers Suggest Voters Will Oust Judge Corey 
Following No-Jail Plea Deal, KTVA (Nov. 7, 2018, 12:17 AM) [hereinafter Rivera, 
Preliminary Numbers], https://www.ktva.com/story/39432108/hfr-judicial-
retention (intimating that poll results from the majority of precincts suggest that 
the incumbent judge narrowly lost the election); Michelle T. Boots, Voters Oust 
Anchorage Judge Targeted for Role in Controversial Plea Agreement, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS (Nov. 10, 2018), https://www.adn.com/alaska-
news/2018/11/06/anchorage-judge-targeted-for-role-in-controversial-plea-
agreement-trailing/. 
 2.  For example, of all states that use judicial retention elections, Alaska has 
the lowest baseline support for retention. See Albert J. Klumpp, Alaska’s Judicial 
Retention Elections: A Comparative Analysis, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 143, 152 (2017) 
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the judge who was not retained, Michael Corey, faced a coordinated anti-
retention campaign resulting from a single decision.3 The campaign 
centered around backlash against Judge Corey for having accepted a plea 
deal in a case of alleged sexual assault where the evidence strongly 
indicated the defendant’s culpability. Coordinated anti-retention 
campaigns had happened before.4 Some of those past campaigns had 
even focused on decisions in a single case.5 However, up until 2018, none 
of those campaigns had ever succeeded. 
That such targeted campaigns had not previously prevailed is a 
testimony to the strength of Alaska’s judicial merit system. The judicial 
merit system was conscientiously designed to avoid undue influence on 
judges.6 To that end, the system includes two components. First, in the 
selection process, a non-partisan committee, called the Judicial Council, 
seeks to identify the most qualified candidates and then passes those 
names on to the governor for the final nomination.7 Second, the merit 
system includes retention elections for judges.8 The purpose of these 
retention elections is to remove judges who are not properly undertaking 
 
(finding Alaska had the lowest baseline median approval rating of judges in 
retention elections among all states that use them between 1996 and 2016). 
 3.  See Daniella Rivera, Alaskans Rally Against Judge’s Retention After Schneider 
Plea Deal, KTVA (Oct. 7, 2018, 3:51 PM) [hereinafter Rivera, Alaskans Rally], 
https://www.ktva.com/story/39244261/alaskans-rally-against-judges-
retention-after-schneider-plea-deal (detailing a coordinated movement against 
Judge Corey for his decision in a particular criminal case). 
 4.  For example, Justice Dana Fabe faced a coordinated anti-retention 
campaign by social conservatives in 2010 for decisions she had made on abortion 
and gay rights. Michelle Theriault Boots, Anchorage Judge Targeted in Retention 
Battle Speaks Publicly for First Time Since Controversial Plea Agreement, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.adn.com/Alaska-
news/2018/10/02/anchorage-judge-targeted-in-retention-battle-speaks-
publicly-for-first-time-since-controversial-plea-agreement/. These coordinated 
campaigns had also targeted lower court judges; Anchorage Superior Court Judge 
Sen Tan faced a coordinated anti-retention campaign for his pro-choice and 
“activist” decisions. Annie Feidt, Group Targeting Superior Court Judge up for 
Retention, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.alaskapublic.org/ 
2012/11/01/group-targeting-superior-court-judge-up-for-retention/. 
 5.  See Andrew Kitchenman, Abortion Ruling at Center of Justices’ Retention 
Battle, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://www.alaskapublic.org/2016/11/02/abortion-ruling-at-center-of-
justices-retention-battle/ (explaining how two supreme court justices were 
targeted for a specific pro-choice decision in which they had taken part). 
 6.  See Teri White Carns & Susie Mason Dosik, Alaska’s Merit Selection of 
Judges: The Council’s Role, Past and Present, 35 ALASKA L. REV. 177, 178 (2018) 
(noting that the system’s creators intended to devise a system that rewarded merit 
rather than political connections). 
 7.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5; Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional 
Convention [hereinafter PACC], at 594, available at https://akleg.gov/ 
pages/constitutional_convention.php (remarks of Del. R. Rivers). 
 8.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6. 
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their judicial duties.9 Yet the past several cycles of judicial elections, 
especially the non-retention of Judge Corey, have revealed that removal 
efforts based on a single unpopular decision, or a small group of 
decisions, are an increasingly prominent threat to judicial independence 
in Alaska. 
This Note will examine how to respond to that growing threat. Part 
II outlines the judicial merit system and examines recent challenges to the 
system’s selection component. Part III examines the dangers that 
retention elections pose to judicial independence. It first looks at the 
history of retention elections across the United States and shows how 
changing conditions have led to increased targeting of judicial retention 
candidates, making retention elections look more like competitive judicial 
elections. After examining the United States broadly, Part III explores 
how Alaska is also at risk of becoming part of the same trend. Finally, Part 
IV proposes potential solutions to mitigate those risks and protect 
Alaskan judges from improper influences as Alaska’s Framers intended. 
It first looks at changes within the existing system. Then it considers the 
potential benefits and costs to replacing the retention election component 
of Alaska’s judicial merit system. Ultimately, it concludes that although 
the system has worked well to this point, recent trends indicate that 
retention elections risk undermining the entire system. Thus, in the 
interest of maintaining judicial independence, retention elections should 
be replaced with a retention process in which the Judicial Council decides 
retention rather than recommending outcomes. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF ALASKA’S JUDICIAL MERIT SYSTEM 
A. Origins & The System Today10 
Alaska’s Framers crafted the judicial merit system to focus on 
selecting judges based on their competence rather than their political 
connections.11 The Framers wanted the judiciary to be independent from 
 
 9.  PACC, supra note 7, at 599 (remarks of Del. Davis). For example, in 2014, 
the Judicial Council recommended not retaining a judge who falsely swore under 
oath that he had completed decisions. Ellen Lockyer, Alaska Judicial Council 
Recommends All but 1 Judge for Retention, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (June 11, 2014), 
https://www.alaskapublic.org/2014/06/11/alaska-judicial-council-
recommends-all-but-1-judge-for-retention/. 
 10.  Because this journal has extensively covered the history of the Alaskan 
judicial merit system in Walter L. Carpeneti & Brett Frazer’s article, Merit Selection 
of Judges in Alaska: The Judicial Council, The Independence of the Judiciary, and the 
Popular Will, 35 ALASKA L. REV. 205 (2018), discussion of that topic has largely been 
omitted from this piece. 
 11.  Carns & Dosik, supra note 6, at 178. 
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the influence of political parties, individuals, and special interest 
groups.12 They believed that the only way to ensure such independence 
was to avoid a system where judges were completely dependent on 
politicians for their selection.13 Instead, a Judicial Council with a mix of 
lawyers and laymen would select judges.14 The lawyers would know who 
was competent and have self-interest in selecting qualified judges.15 The 
laymen on the Council would provide a check on the lawyers and supply 
a form of public input.16 In order to incorporate democratic 
accountability, the governor, an elected official, would be the final 
decision-maker by selecting one of the judicial nominees put forward by 
the Judicial Council.17 A now-famous quote from one of the Convention 
delegates sums up the merit selection process: “[T]he judicial council will 
seek for the best available timber, and we take a bow to the governor in 
taking his choice of two persons that are nominated . . . .”18 
Although the selection system partially insulated judges, Alaska’s 
Framers wanted to ensure that judges were accountable for their 
performance on the bench while still not letting politics creep into the 
process.19 They worried judges could abuse lifetime tenure by becoming 
unresponsive to the will of the people and refusing to change with the 
times.20 They also wanted a method to remove judges from the bench who 
were not adequately performing their duties.21 However, they worried 
competitive elections could undermine judicial independence through 
the incurring of “financial and psychological debts”22 and would result in 
a judge having to “keep peering over his shoulder to find out whether [a 
 
 12.  PACC, supra note 7, at 596 (remarks of Del. V. Rivers) (quoting Hawaii 
Legislative Handbook) (“Independence of the judiciary is a fundamental principle 
of our American court system . . . . [T]he first step is to find the right method of 
selecting judges which will insure a bench free from the influence and control of 
party politics, individuals, or pressure groups.”). 
 13.  See Buckalew v. Holloway, 604 P.2d 240, 245–46 (Alaska 1979) (explaining 
that judges cannot be truly independent in a system where they serve at the 
pleasure of others, such as in a system where governors are solely responsible for 
appointment). 
 14.  PACC, supra note 7, at 585 (remarks of Del. McLaughlin). 
 15.  Id. at 585–86 (remarks of Del. McLaughlin). 
 16.  Id. at 585 (remarks of Del. McLaughlin). 
 17.  Carpeneti & Frazer, supra note 10, at 207. 
 18.  PACC, supra note 7, at 594 (remarks of Del. R. Rivers). 
 19.  See Buckalew v. Holloway, 604 P.2d 240, 244 (Alaska 1979) (“The framers 
of the Alaska Constitution expressly sought a system in which justices and judges 
would be accountable for their performance in office.”). 
 20.  PACC, supra note 7, at 598 (remarks of Del. Davis). 
 21.  See id. at 599 (remarks of Del. Davis) (“[T]he plan which is set up here 
gives the best of the two systems with the result that when the procedure is 
followed we have taken the best means yet devised . . . to get rid of judges who 
are not able to properly do their job.”). 
 22.  Buckalew, 604 P.2d at 245. 
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decision in the lead-up to an election] is popular or unpopular.”23 
To balance these competing concerns, Alaska’s Framers chose 
retention elections, which are a Progressive Era innovation intended to 
limit the influence of politics on judges while maintaining some 
accountability to the electorate.24 The Framers decided retention elections 
could avoid the threats to judicial independence involved with other 
types of judicial elections.25 Alaska’s Framers did not want the judiciary 
to be swayed by the public at particular moments, so they sought to avoid 
situations where judges were voted out of office based on the “whims of 
the time” or a decision in one particular case.26 As a result, the retention 
election system recognizes that voter outrage is a source of undue 
influence.27 Both the Framers’ statements and the system’s design 
emphasize that retention elections are supposed to be based on a judge’s 
complete record, not a single case. 
While the judicial merit system today aligns strongly with those 
founding values, the Judicial Council has updated its processes over time 
in order to better attract the most qualified candidates to the judiciary.28 
For example, in the mid-1970s, the Judicial Council began requesting 
additional information such as writing samples and examples of litigated 
cases which applicants had worked on to better assess potential judges.29 
In the 1976 elections, the Judicial Council started conducting retention 
evaluations.30 The Judicial Council then updated the retention procedures 
to increase public input during the 1990s.31 The retention-based reforms 
ultimately also help attract the most qualified candidates by providing 
higher quality information for the electorate and thus better job security 
for judges facing retention.32 
 
 23.  PACC, supra note 7, at 584 (remarks of Del. McLaughlin); see also 
Carpeneti & Frazer supra note 10, at 213 (interpreting the passage in the same 
manner). 
 24.  Klumpp, supra note 2, at 146. 
 25.  Buckalew, 604 P.2d at 245–46; Carpeneti & Frazer, supra note 10, at 212. 
 26.  PACC, supra note 7, at 598 (remarks of Del. Davis). 
 27.  See Buckalew, 604 P.2d at 246 (contrasting influence of presiding judge 
with “undue influence potential in voter outrage”). 
 28.  Carns & Dosik, supra note 6, at 183–84. 
 29.  Id. at 183. 
 30.  KEVIN M. ESTERLING & KATHLEEN M. SAMPSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION 
EVALUATION PROGRAMS IN FOUR STATES: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 76 
(1998), http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Jud_Ret_Eval_ 
Report_Full_1EB9F38566F5A.pdf. 
 31.  Id. at 80. 
 32.  Cf. ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CHOOSING STATE JUDGES: A 
PLAN FOR REFORM 1 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites 
/default/files/2019-08/Report_Choosing_State_Judges_2018.pdf (arguing 
against any judicial elections because they introduce uncertainty that can 
undermine job security). 
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Today, judges are initially appointed by the governor from a list of 
choices developed by the non-partisan Judicial Council, which ensures 
judges are qualified on their merits.33 After that, rather than the judge 
facing an opponent for reelection, judges must regularly face retention 
elections in which the public votes “either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on whether the 
judge should remain in office.”34 As part of the retention elections, the 
Judicial Council recommends for or against retention.35 Judges cannot 
actively campaign unless there is an anti-retention campaign.36 A judge 
can be retained an unlimited number of times up to the mandatory 
retirement age of 70.37 
As dictated by the Alaska Constitution, the Judicial Council has 
seven members: three attorneys with six-year terms appointed by the 
Alaska Bar; three non-attorneys appointed by the governor and subject to 
majority confirmation by the legislature also with six-year terms; and the 
chief justice of the Alaska Supreme Court who serves as an ex-officio 
member and a tie-breaking vote.38 Appointments to the Council are 
subject to two criteria; they are to be made with “due consideration” to 
geographic representation and cannot be made with regard to political 
affiliation.39 
The Judicial Council’s selection process begins when it receives 
notice of an imminent or existing judicial vacancy.40 To fill the vacancy, 
the Judicial Council starts an application process by posting vacancies 
online and in the press.41 It looks for people who “stand out as most 
qualified” from the Council’s consideration of numerous traits.42 The 
applicants are asked to provide a myriad of professional information.43 
 
 33.  ALASKA COURT SYS., ALASKA’S CONSTITUTION: SELECTING JUDGES BASED ON 
MERIT AND JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS (Mar. 2017), 
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/forms/docs/pub-28.pdf. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8; Carns & Dosik, supra note 6, at 177–78. 
 39.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8. 
 40.  Kirk v. Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 41.  Carns & Dosik, supra note 6, at 186. 
 42.  Those traits include: “professional competence, including written and 
oral communication skills; integrity; fairness; temperament; judgment, including 
common sense; legal and life experience; and demonstrated commitment to public 
and community service.” Id. at 184. 
 43.  This information includes: work and education history; why they are 
seeking nomination and why they think they are well-qualified; lay and attorney 
references; six cases the attorney has worked on in the last three years, so that the 
Council can contact those involved; a writing sample, and information to evaluate 
potential conflicts of interest. Id. at 187. The Judicial Council also requests 
certifications of competence to serve along with a release of records that may be 
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Next, the Judicial Council interviews the applicants.44 Finally, the Judicial 
Council gets public input from members of the Bar and lay people. 
Members of the Bar are invited to fill out surveys with comments,45 while 
members of the public are invited to provide comments online or at public 
hearings.46 The Judicial Council holds these hearings in communities that 
will be impacted by the new judge, and the hearings are usually well-
attended.47 The Judicial Council then votes, and nominees with at least 
four votes are forwarded to the governor along with all the public 
information the Council gathered.48 The governor is then required to fill 
the vacancy by appointing one of the Judicial Council’s nominees.49 
Shifting to the second part of the system, every judge must face her 
first retention election at the first general election held more than three 
years after her appointment.50 A judge must receive a majority of the votes 
to be retained.51 Judges who are retained face elections at regular intervals 
thereafter.52 If judges wish to be considered for retention, they must 
declare that intention by August 1 of the year of the election.53 
As part of the retention election, every household on the registered 
voters list receives information including: the Judicial Council’s 
recommendation for or against retention; a short statement from the 
Judicial Council evaluating judicial performance; and a picture and short 
advocacy statement from the judge.54 The Judicial Council’s 
recommendations started in 1976 as a means of correcting the typical 
dearth of information voters have about judicial candidates.55 The 
 
necessary to investigate such capacity, as well as Bar files and the applicant’s 
criminal record. Id. at 191–93. 
 44.  Id. at 195. 
 45.  Id. at 190. 
 46.  Id. at 198. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5; Carns & Dosik, supra note 6, at 201–02. 
 49.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5; ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.070 (2020); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 22.15.170(a)–(b) (2020); Carns & Dosik, supra note 6, at 201–02. 
 50.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6. One exception is district court judges who, due 
to their shorter retention terms, face their first retention election at the first general 
election held more than two years after their appointment. ALASKA STAT. § 
15.35.100(a) (2020). 
 51.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 7; ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.450 (2020). 
 52.  Supreme Court justices face retention every ten years. ALASKA CONST. art. 
IV, § 6. Court of appeals judges face retention every eight years. ALASKA STAT. § 
15.35.053 (2020). Superior court judges face retention every six years. ALASKA 
CONST. art. IV, § 6. District court judges face retention every four years. ALASKA 
STAT. § 15.35.100(a) (2020). 
 53.  ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.35.040, .055, .070, .110 (2020). 
 54.  Id. §§ 15.58.010, .020, .030(g), .050. 
 55.  See Seth S. Andersen, Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs, 34 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1375, 1375 (2001) (“Judicial retention evaluation programs are a key 
component of efforts to make judicial retention elections more meaningful 
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recommendations are based on surveys from different people who 
interact with the courts, court records, public input, and statewide public 
hearings.56 The recommendations also look at factors meant to ensure a 
judge is competent including disqualification rate, affirmation or reversal 
rate on appeal, disciplinary proceedings, and whether the judge has 
regularly rendered timely decisions.57 By including public input and 
focusing on judicial competence, the recommendations not only ensure 
access to information about the judges, but also reduce dependence on 
interest groups and the media who may have political motivations.58 
While judges seeking retention are subject to the state election 
campaign statute,59 most of the restrictions on their conduct in retention 
elections come from the state judicial ethics canon, the Alaska Code of 
Judicial Conduct.60 One key provision bans judges from making any 
promises about how they will decide cases beyond saying that they will 
faithfully apply the law.61 
The remainder of the Code of Judicial Conduct is split between what 
judges can do before and after active opposition. The Code does not 
 
contests for voters by providing objective, survey-based information on the 
performance of judges standing for retention.”); BANNON, supra note 32, at 5; AM. 
BAR ASS’N, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE PROCESS OF CHOOSING JUDGES 9 (2008), 
https://www.americanbar.org/products/ecd/ebk/217453/. 
 56.  The people surveyed include: police officers, court employees, attorneys, 
jurors, and social workers. ALASKA COURT SYS., supra note 33; Frequently Asked 
Questions about Retention, ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, (last visited Aug. 31, 2020), 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/faq.html. 
 57.  Carpeneti & Frazer, supra note 10, at 209. For a more complete explanation 
of the process and to see an example of the performance evaluations, see ALASKA 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 56. 
 58.  See Andersen, supra note 55, at 1378 (highlighting that performance 
evaluations help counter the politically-motivated evaluations from interest 
groups); AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 55, at 14 (explaining that performance reviews 
and statements from candidates reduce dependence on interest groups and 
media). 
 59.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.010(a)(1) (2020). 
 60.  ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1998). 
 61.  Id. at CANON 5A(3)(d) (1998). While this provision may face First 
Amendment challenges under Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, see 536 U.S. 
765, 788 (2002) (striking down a similar, although not identical, provision in 
Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct on First Amendment grounds), the 
executive director of Alaska’s Commission on Judicial Conduct—the body that 
oversees judicial ethics in Alaska—has argued Alaska’s provision is 
distinguishable and the Code of Judicial Conduct itself says that it should be 
interpreted so as to avoid violating the First Amendment. Alaska Right to Life 
Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2007); ALASKA CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 5A(3)(d) Commentary (1998). The Ninth Circuit did 
not reach the merits in a lawsuit over the provision; the lawsuit involved Alaska 
Right to Life’s questionnaire asking judges their position on issues such as 
abortion, and judges declined to substantively respond for fear of violating the 
Code of Judicial Conduct. Alaska Right to Life, 504 F.3d at 843–44. 
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define active opposition. Instead, it says the term should be broadly 
construed and can include a negative recommendation, press 
conferences, ads, and similar publicity even if they do not target a specific 
judge.62 However, it also says individuals speaking at Judicial Council 
hearings are unlikely to count.63 Importantly, no deadline exists for 
declaring one’s intention to oppose a judge’s retention,64 and recent 
history has seen active opposition arise as late as a few days prior to an 
election.65 
Before active opposition arises, judges can, if unsolicited, speak at 
public gatherings or in the media to discuss their candidacy.66 However, 
if they anticipate active opposition and can document the reason for their 
suspicions, judges can also form an election campaign committee and 
prepare media and campaign materials.67 Once active opposition exists, 
judges can, through their campaign committee, publish advertisements 
and other campaign materials.68 Judges may only campaign based on 
their fitness as a judge,69 and the standard for campaigning is 
reasonableness.70 The Commission on Judicial Conduct can investigate 
any alleged violation of the Code on its own motion or based on a written 
complaint.71 However, the Commission can only recommend 
punishment, which must ultimately come from the Supreme Court in the 
form of a reprimand, public or private censure, suspension, or removal or 
retirement from judicial office.72 
Alaska’s judicial merit system has been recognized as one of the best 
in the country. The American Bar Association and a former United States 
Supreme Court justice have recognized the important benefits of judicial 
merit systems.73 Studies have also found empirical support for the balance 
of political insulation and accountability that the initial selection process 
 
 62.  ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 5C(2) Commentary (1998). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  ALASKA COURT SYS., supra note 33. 
 65.  Tracy Kalytiak, Mailer Targets Justice Fabe, MAT-SU VALLEY FRONTIERSMAN 
(Oct. 30, 2010), https://www.frontiersman.com/news/mailer-targets-justice-
fabe/article_599d1e7a-4b40-55f9-8d5d-23b0b775e0e0.html. 
 66.  ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 5C(1)(b) (1998). 
 67.  Id. at CANON 5C(1)(c)–(d) & Commentary. 
 68.  Id. at CANON 5C(2)–(3). 
 69.  ALASKA COURT SYS., supra note 33. 
 70.  ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 5C(3) & Commentary (1998). 
 71.  ALASKA STAT. § 22.30.011(a)(3)(E) (2020). 
 72.  Id. § 22.30.011(d)(2). 
 73.  See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 791 (2002) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the Missouri Plan, on which 
Alaska’s system is based, reduces the threat of judicial impartiality from 
elections); AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 55, at 7, 9 (recognizing that merit selection 
encourages community involvement, limits political favoritism, ensures that 
judges are well-qualified, and helps attract more diverse candidates). 
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creates.74 
Legal professionals have also recognized Alaska as a leader in 
judicial independence. Attorneys general from both Democratic and 
Republican administrations have applauded its excellence.75 Alaska 
follows former United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s quality judicial initiative plan.76 Further, the judiciary has a 
strong reputation for efficiency and integrity both within the state and 
nationwide, which is punctuated by the lack of corruption or 
malfeasance.77 Perhaps nothing is more indicative of its success than the 
fact that, prior to Judge Corey, only five judges were not retained in the 
over sixty year history of the state.78 A study looking at every retention 
election in Alaska between 1976 and 1996 found a positive correlation 
between Judicial Council ratings and retention votes, suggesting the 
retention system is trusted by Alaskans.79 All of this success is why 
Alaska’s judicial merit system is worth protecting against challenges that 
seek to undermine its founding principles, the topic to which this Note 
turns next. 
B. Recent Challenges to the Judicial Merit System 
In recent years, the selection part of Alaska’s judicial merit system 
has come under increasing assault by individuals seeking to undermine 
the independence the selection process engenders.80 Periodically, 
governors have contravened their constitutional obligation by attempting 
to appoint someone other than a Judicial Council nominee.81 For example, 
in 2004, Governor Frank Murkowski rejected all the names on the 
appointment list.82 Following a strong public outcry about the need for 
judicial independence, Governor Murkowski backed down and 
 
 74.  See BANNON, supra note 32, at 6–7, 9 (recognizing that the combination of 
a nominating committee and gubernatorial appointment produces effective 
political insulation while maintaining accountability). 
 75.  Carpeneti & Frazer, supra note 10, at 233. 
 76.  JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. 
LEGAL SYS., THE O’CONNOR JUDICIAL SELECTION PLAN 9 (2014) [hereinafter 
O’CONNOR JUDICIAL SELECTION PLAN]. 
 77.  MICHAEL L. BOYER, The State Courts and Alaska Politics: Independence, Public 
Accountability, and Political Influence, in ALASKA POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 605, 
625 (Clive Thomas et al. ed., 2016); Carpeneti & Frazer, supra note 10, at 233. 
 78.  Carns & Dosik, supra note 6, at 202. 
 79.  ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 30, at 70. 
 80.  See Klumpp, supra note 2, at 144 (explaining how proposed changes to the 
Judicial Council’s makeup would result in the governor’s increased influence over 
the selection process). 
 81.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5; ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.07.070, .15.170(a)–(b) 
(2020); Carpeneti & Frazer, supra note 10, at 221. 
 82.  Boyer, supra note 77, at 618. 
37.2 KUCHINSKI FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2021  3:58 PM 
2020 RETAINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 245 
appointed one of the original nominees.83 
More recently, the challenges have taken different forms.84 In 2009, 
challengers filed a lawsuit claiming that the judicial merit selection 
system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because attorneys had more voting power via their control 
over the Bar’s nominees to the Judicial Council.85 The district court 
dismissed the suit on three grounds: the initial selection of judicial 
nominees by the Judicial Council did not involve an election so the lack 
of voting equality was not a valid claim; the Bar’s Board of Governors was 
within the limited purpose exception of one person, one vote; and one 
person, one vote did not apply for appointments of non-legislative 
officers.86 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district 
court’s ruling.87 The court chastised the plaintiffs for attempting to enact 
a policy change on the method of selecting judges without going through 
the state constitutional amendment process.88 
Following the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion,89 opponents of the judicial 
merit system then tried to change the method of selecting judges by 
amending Alaska’s constitution.90 In 2014, the challengers put forth a 
Senate resolution to limit the role of attorneys on the Judicial Council 
while increasing the power of the governor.91 The power shift in the 
Judicial Council would have been accomplished by doubling the number 
of non-attorney members selected by the governor and making attorney 
members subject to legislative confirmation.92 Sharp bipartisan 
opposition to the resolution emerged based on a fear that the change 
would undermine the independence of the judiciary and increase the 
influence of politics in the selection and retention of judges.93 The 
resolution was withdrawn before a full floor vote in the state senate.94 
In the legislature, several bills have been introduced that seek to 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  For a more extensive review of historical challenges to the confirmation 
process, see Carpeneti & Frazers’ article, supra note 10. 
 85.  Id. at 221–22. 
 86.  Id. at 222–23. 
 87.  Kirk v. Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2010); Carpeneti & Frazer, 
supra note 10, at 223. 
 88.  Kirk, 623 F.3d at 891, 900. 
 89.  For a more extensive review of attempts to amend Article IV of the Alaska 
Constitution, see Carpeneti & Frazer’s article, supra note 10, at 225–27. 
 90.  Id. at 225. 
 91.  Id. at 225 & n.150; Klumpp, supra note 2, at 144. 
 92.  Carpeneti & Frazer, supra note 10, at 225–26. 
 93.  See About Us, JUSTICE NOT POLITICS ALASKA (last visited Aug. 31, 2020), 
http://justicenotpoliticsalaska.org/pages/about-us/ (describing how and why 
the organization was founded in response to efforts to amend Article IV). 
 94.  Carpeneti & Frazer, supra note 10, at 227. 
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expand the options for removing judges from the bench. For example, in 
2017, HB 251 sought to make the exercise of legislative power by a judicial 
official an impeachable offense and shield any such impeachment from 
judicial review.95 While that bill never advanced from committee,96 it may 
foreshadow increased scrutiny of judges based on individual rulings and 
policy disagreements. A number of factors, both nationwide and specific 
to Alaska, make retention elections increasingly vulnerable to political 
influence that corrodes judicial independence. 
III. INCREASING THREATS TO PRESERVING INDEPENDENCE AND 
MAINTAINING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
A. Generalized Threats to Independence in Judicial Elections 
Observers have long realized that judicial elections present a number 
of issues for judges.97 The American Bar Association has recognized 
judicial elections can be both costly and time consuming and often 
provide no actual quality screen for the candidates.98 Elections can also 
create challenging ethical dilemmas for judges.99 Judicial elections 
frequently involve campaigns for or against certain candidates based 
either on perceptions of how they will rule on certain issues or as part of 
broader efforts to shape a court’s ideological makeup.100 Some 
commentators have concluded that the whole point of judicial elections is 
to ensure that judges cannot rule counter to the majority’s view on 
issues.101 States have sought to create restrictions on judicial politicization 
by barring judicial candidates from discussing their views on disputed 
issues that could come before the courts.102 However, the United States 
 
 95.  Bill Raftery, Alaska: Bill Allows Legislature to Declare Judicial Decisions 
Impeachable “Malfeasance”, Removes Judicial Review; Similar to 2016 Kansas Senate 
Effort, GAVEL TO GAVEL (May 18, 2017), 
http://gaveltogavel.us/tag/alaska/?doing_wp_cron=1587432988.918528079986
5722656250; ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHO PAYS FOR 
JUDICIAL RACES? 57 n.44 (Dec. 14, 2017). 
 96.  Bill History/Action for Legislature HB 251, THE ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE 
(May 15, 2017), 
https://www.akleg.gov/basis/Bill/Detail/30?Root=HB%20251#tab6_4. 
 97.  See, e.g., PACC, supra note 7, at 584 (remarks of Del. McLaughlin) 
(warning judges would constantly be checking the popularity of their decisions in 
an elective system). 
 98.  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 55, at 8. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 4–5. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002) 
(discussing a Minnesota prohibition against a judicial candidate “announc[ing] 
his or her views on disputed legal or political issues”). 
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Supreme Court has found that those judicial ethics canons can violate the 
judge’s First Amendment rights.103 Taken together, these issues can 
undermine public trust in the courts by threatening judicial 
impartiality.104 
Additionally, the influence of money in judicial elections has long 
been an issue.105 A recent case that reached the United States Supreme 
Court, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,106 shows the level of influence that 
interested parties can have on judges via campaign contributions.107 In 
Caperton, a West Virginia jury had awarded the plaintiffs $50 million in 
damages.108 Before the state’s high court heard the appeal, Don 
Blankenship, the chairman, CEO, and president of the defendant 
corporation, Massey Coal, spent over $3 million to support a supreme 
court candidate through a combination of PAC contributions and 
independent expenditures.109 Blankenship’s preferred candidate won and 
then cast the deciding vote in favor of overturning the $50 million verdict 
against his company—twice.110 The United States Supreme Court ruled 
the campaign contributions were of such an extraordinary amount that 
the probability of actual bias by the judge was so high that it violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.111 
While most cases are not as egregious as Caperton, the influence of 
money on judicial decision-making is widespread. Research has found a 
correlation between donations and rulings that disappears when a judge 
is in her final term and will not be running for reelection.112 There may be 
an increased cause for concern after Citizens United v. FEC,113 which led to 
a spike in the amount of money spent in judicial races.114 Consequently, 
the influence of money on judges may be even greater now than at the 
time of Caperton. 
These influences have already impacted American perceptions of 
 
 103.  Id. at 788. 
 104.  See Sandra Day O’Connor, The Essentials and Expendables of the Missouri 
Plan, 74 MO. L. REV. 479, 480 (2009) (noting that “the public’s trust in our courts is 
rapidly deteriorating”). 
 105.  WHITE PAPER ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS 1–2 
(Oct. 2011) (noting how the flow of money only increased over the 2000s). 
 106.  556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 107.  WHITE PAPER ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 105, at 3. 
 108.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872. 
 109.  Id. at 873. 
 110.  See id. at 874–75 (noting both decisions were three to two in favor of 
overturning the verdict). 
 111.  Id. at 872. 
 112.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 4. 
 113.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 114.  See WHITE PAPER ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 105, at 3 (explaining it 
was no accident that the spike in money spent in judicial races was in 2010, 
immediately following the Citizens United ruling). 
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judicial elections. Seventy percent of the American public believes judges 
are influenced by campaign contributions.115 In 1991, after holding that 
judicial elections are within the scope of the Voting Rights Act, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized the “fundamental tension between the 
ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral 
politics.”116 Judges themselves have increasingly acknowledged the 
corrosive influence of elections on judicial independence as well. Former 
California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus analogized deciding a 
controversial case when facing reelection to “finding a crocodile in your 
bathtub when you go in to shave in the morning. You know it’s there, and 
you try not to think about it, but it’s hard to think about much else while 
you’re shaving.”117 
Empirical research supports concerns about this tension, with one 
study finding that more than a quarter of judges believe that campaign 
contributions affect their decisions.118 For example, judges may be too 
afraid of the electoral consequences to enforce constitutional rights, or 
they may become “tougher” on crime in order to stay in office.119 The 
primary fear is that when judges make different decisions based on 
electoral consequences, they undermine the legitimacy of their office.120 
B. Growing Risk of Judicial Retention Elections Undermining 
Independence 
These general concerns about judicial elections increasingly apply to 
non-competitive judicial retention elections as well. Retention elections 
are meant to walk a fine line by injecting accountability into the system 
while also protecting judicial independence.121 In fact, Alaska’s Framers 
implemented retention elections in order to strike just that balance.122 
Nationally, however, there are increasing signs that the efficacy of 
 
 115.  O’Connor, supra note 104, at 488. 
 116.  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400, 404 (1991). 
 117.  Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of 
State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 
1133 (1997). 
 118.  O’Connor, supra note 104, at 488. 
 119.  Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule 
of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 727–28 (1995). 
 120.  O’Connor, supra note 104, at 489 (“All of this is deeply troubling because 
the legitimacy of the judicial branch rests entirely on its promise to be fair and 
impartial. If the public loses faith in that – if they believe that judges are just 
politicians in robes – then there is no reason to prefer their interpretation of the 
law or Constitution over the opinions of the real politicians representing the 
electorate.”). 
 121.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 5. 
 122.  Buckalew v. Holloway, 604 P.2d 240, 244–45 (Alaska 1979). 
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this careful balance is weakening123 More and more non-competitive 
retention elections are turning into “ideological battleground[s] over 
judicial philosophies and specific decisions . . . .”124 This is particularly 
true in elections where there is higher funding, targeting by politicians 
and special interest groups, and increased media attention.125 Some 
scholars have concluded that judicial retention elections are incompatible 
with the judicial function “since [they] amount[] to the imposition of 
decisional accountability on the courts and hold[] judges to ‘standards 
that . . . are incompatible with the institutional integrity of the 
judiciary.’”126 
In the past several decades, there has been an increasing number of 
contentious judicial retention elections.127 In California’s 1986 judicial 
retention elections, three sitting supreme court justices were ousted for 
their record of overturning capital sentences.128 That retention election 
appeared to be an outlier, especially with its millions in spending, until 
2010 when three sitting supreme court justices in Iowa were targeted by 
social conservatives and not retained for a decision that found that the 
state constitution included the right for same-sex couples to marry.129 
Since 2010, every election cycle has had at least one million-dollar judicial 
retention election covering a total of sixteen justices in five states.130 
Compared to zero such races between 1999 and 2009, it is clear that the 
impact of Citizens United is felt even in retention elections.131 Given that 
the hot button issues that often cause these contentious retention elections 
are not limited to any particular state, this trend is likely to get worse.132 
 Research has also found other indications that retention elections 
have become more like competitive judicial elections. As a baseline 
matter, judges still know that an unpopular decision, even one required 
by law, can cost them their jobs.133 Some judges who face retention 
 
 123.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 10. 
 124.  B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1431 (2001); ALASKA COURT SYS., supra note 33. 
 125.  Ryan Fortson & Kristin S. Knudsen, A Survey of Studies on Judicial Selection, 
32 ALASKA JUST. F., Summer/Fall 2015, at 11. 
 126.  Dann & Hansen, supra note 124, at 1436. 
 127.  For a more complete 20th century history of contentious judicial retention 
elections where judges were targeted for a small number of decisions, see Dann & 
Hansen, supra note 124, at 1431–35. 
 128.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 21 n.91. 
 129.  Id. at 10. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id.; GREYTAK ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BANKROLLING THE BENCH 13 
(2015). 
 132.  Dann & Hansen, supra note 124, at 1436. 
 133.  GREYTAK ET AL., supra note 131, at 22; see BANNON, supra note 32, at 11 
(discussing politicized judicial reselection in general). 
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elections are, perhaps as a result, making different decisions than those 
who do not face retention.134 In addition, campaigns against judges based 
on their decisions on certain issues can actually make judges in non-
partisan races more responsive to public opinion than judges who face 
partisan elections.135 As a result, it seems increasingly likely that many of 
the ills of judicial elections in general may come to pass in retention 
elections as well. 
C. Increasing Risk of Undue Influence in Judicial Retention 
Elections in Alaska 
Alaska’s elections are not immune to these ills. In line with scholars’ 
warnings that no states are free from divisive issues in the courts, 136 
Alaska’s courts and judicial retention elections regularly see contentious 
topics play out. Alaskan courts are particularly prone to fights based 
around polarizing issues because they have a strong record of 
championing individual rights.137 Further, Alaskan retention candidates 
have become among the most frequently targeted for removal in the 
nation, even in the absence of negative reviews from the Judicial 
Council.138 In the 2010, 2012, and 2016 retention elections, judges were 
targeted for their rulings relating to abortion.139 In 2018, Judge Corey was 
targeted by a campaign that grew out of the #MeToo movement.140 Given 
this increased peril, it is likely that retention candidates will have to 
campaign more and spend more,141 both of which can undermine judicial 
independence.142 
Officials in and around the courts have increasingly recognized this 
danger. The Judicial Council’s official online Frequently Asked Questions 
section warns against politicizing retention elections and basing them 
around contentious court decisions.143 Further, the state’s official 
 
 134.  See Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 125, at 1, 9–10 (explaining that judges 
facing retention election are more likely to overturn lower court decisions). 
 135.  Id. at 11. 
 136.  Dann & Hansen, supra note 124, at 1436. 
 137.  Boyer, supra note 77, at 610 (providing, as an example, a state case that 
held the state constitutional right to privacy in one’s home protected possession 
of a small amount of marijuana for personal use in the home). 
 138.  Klumpp, supra note 2, at 157. 
 139.  Boots, supra note 4; Kitchenman, supra note 5. 
 140.  See Rivera, Alaskans Rally, supra note 3 (describing protesters with 
#MeToo signs at a rally opposing Judge Corey’s retention). 
 141.  Klumpp, supra note 2, at 158. 
 142.  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 55, at 8; O’Connor, supra note 104, at 480. 
 143.  ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 56 (“Sometimes a judge is asked to 
resolve a contentious or divisive dispute, or a dispute involving a social issue. As 
in all cases, a judge must do his or her best to fairly and impartially apply the law, 
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pamphlet explaining the judicial merit system warns that the lack of a 
deadline for declaring one’s intent to oppose a judge’s retention “makes 
judges vulnerable to last-minute, unfair opposition campaigns.”144 Finally, 
a Continuing Legal Education (CLE) program in May 2017 was dedicated 
to the topic of “The Changing National Landscape in Judicial Retention 
and Its Implications for Alaska.”145 Introductory remarks to the CLE by 
former Chief Justice Carpeneti warned: 
In the 2016 election cycle, some results in Alaska’s judicial 
retention elections caused many observers to wonder if our 
constitutional merit system is vulnerable to the possibility that 
coordinated non-retention campaigns against competent and 
qualified sitting judges could be successful, and that we may be 
close to losing the services of some really good and fair judges 
for reasons that have nothing to do with judicial merit.146 
Recent cycles have shown this growing threat to retention elections 
in Alaska. In 2010, Justice Fabe was targeted by conservative groups for 
her rulings on abortion and gay marriage.147 The main opposition came 
in the form of a mailer, specifically listing out decisions for which she was 
being targeted.148 This mailer was sent out mere days before her election, 
which gave Justice Fabe little chance to respond before the election.149 
Also of note, this campaign was after Citizens United and most of the 
money for the mailer came from out-of-state groups.150 Then, in 2012, 
Anchorage Superior Court Judge Tan was targeted for several 1990s cases 
in which he defended abortion rights.151 Notably, the Judicial Council 
took the irregular step of running a few thousand dollars’ worth of ads 
on Tan’s behalf, which highlighted the Council’s positive 
 
even if it requires the judge to issue a decision that is unpopular, or which conflicts 
with the judge’s personal beliefs. . . . From time to time, efforts are made to unseat 
a judge because of political or ideological disagreement with a particular decision. 
These efforts may be aimed at influencing future decisions of other judges . . . . 
[E]fforts to unseat a judge [for political reasons] diminish the neutrality and 
impartiality of our judiciary.”). 
 144.  ALASKA COURT SYS., supra note 33 (emphasis added). 
 145.  This CLE is described in Klumpp, supra note 2. I owe special thanks to Dr. 
Klumpp for his help with this source. “[The CLE] addressed ethical issues and 
conflict-of-interest questions facing retention candidates and potential supporters 
and opponents, discussed the extent to which judges can campaign on their own 
behalf and solicit outside assistance, and shared stories of successful retention 
campaigns and the strategies that those campaigns employed.” Id. at 144. 
 146.  Id. at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147.  Boots, supra note 4. 
 148.  Kalytiak, supra note 65. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Feidt, supra note 4. 
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recommendation of the Judge.152 
The 2016 election saw Justices Bolger and Maassen targeted by social 
conservatives for a specific decision regarding the ability of minors to 
access abortion without parental notification.153 The Judicial Council had 
recommended both justices for retention, and the Council’s executive 
director questioned whether retention decisions should be based on a 
single decision rather than the comprehensive evaluation the Council 
performs.154 Many in the legal community were quick to come to the 
justices’ defense thereby minimizing their need to defend themselves or 
campaign.155 In the end, Justices Bolger and Maassen were both retained 
with 58% and 57% approval respectively,156 although that level of support 
was significantly below Alaska’s median statewide retention rate over the 
previous two decades.157 Despite the judges’ ultimate retention, these 
elections show judges are increasingly being targeted for their decisions 
on contentious issues. 
The 2018 retention election and opposition against Judge Corey was 
different than what had come before.158 Chiefly, neither the positive 
Judicial Council recommendation nor concerns that a campaign based on 
a single decision could threaten the judicial system were enough to 
convince voters to retain Judge Corey.159 Furthermore, unlike many of the 
previous anti-retention campaigns, both conservatives and liberals 
targeted the judge for the same decision.160 The entire opposition 
campaign was focused around Judge Corey’s decision to approve a no-
jail plea deal for a defendant accused of sexual violence,161 which he 
approved because he felt it was in line with the law.162 
 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Kitchenman, supra note 5. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Alaska Results, THE N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:22 AM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/Alaska. 
 157.  The median approval rate for all statewide judicial retention elections in 
Alaska between 1996 and 2016 was 63.4%. Klumpp, supra note 2, at 153. Since that 
data includes the 2016 elections of Justices Bolger and Maassen, id., the median 
rate for all other statewide judicial retention elections for that time period is higher. 
See id. 
 158.  See Rivera, Preliminary Numbers, supra note 1 (noting that voters had 
never before voted to remove a judge who was recommended for retention by the 
Council). 
 159.  Id.; Rivera, Alaskans Rally, supra note 3. 
 160.  See, e.g., Rivera, Preliminary Numbers, supra note 1; Rivera, Alaskans Rally, 
supra note 3; Klumpp, supra note 2; Alaska Results, supra note 156. 
 161.  Our Story, NO MORE FREE PASSES (last visited Aug. 31, 2020), 
https://www.nomorefreepasses.org/mission-index-impact. 
 162.  Rivera, Preliminary Numbers, supra note 1. That loophole was 
subsequently closed via the legislature. Kristen Durand, Alaska House of 
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Some opponents of Judge Corey suggested that his non-retention 
was not actually such an anomalous result because the Judicial Council 
had completed its recommendations before he approved the plea deal 
and might have not recommended him after he approved the deal.163 
However, there are reasons to doubt that suggestion. First, the 
Department of Law concluded the sentence was consistent with state law 
at the time, which suggests that Judge Corey’s decision was a competent 
one.164 Second, the Judicial Council does not base its recommendations on 
single decisions, so it is unlikely this one case would have changed 
anything.165 
The ouster of Judge Corey demonstrates the challenges judges face 
in retention elections. His non-retention highlights how judges often have 
difficulty responding to the charges leveled against them. Even after his 
decision, when Judge Corey felt like he could finally respond, he could 
only speak in generalities which were in line with the ethics rule, saying 
only that he was aware of the uproar and was obliged to follow the law.166 
Further exacerbating the challenge he faced was that, unlike with Justices 
Bolger and Maassen in 2016,167 no one organized in his support.168 The 
vote against Judge Corey also reveals one of the avenues for increased 
politicization of retention election: increasing media focus on specific 
judicial decisions.169 
In the end, Judge Corey became the first judge to be “unseated solely 
by a popular uprising.”170 Troublingly, this result could yield a chilling 
effect on future decisions.171 Knowing that unpopular decisions, even 
those required by law, could cost them their job, judges may bow to 
pressure and change their decisions.172 If that happens, it would 
undermine the very independence that Alaska’s Framers wanted to 
protect.173 The final Part posits how to avoid that grim possibility. 
 




 163.  Rivera, Preliminary Numbers, supra note 1. 
 164.  Rivera, Alaskans Rally, supra note 3. 
 165.  ALASKA COURT SYS., supra note 33. 
 166.  Boots, supra note 4. 
 167.  Kitchenman, supra note 5. 
 168.  See Rivera, Alaskans Rally, supra note 3 (stating that only one supporter 
showed up to advocate for Judge Corey’s retainment). 
 169.  Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 125, at 11. 
 170.  Boots, supra note 4. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 125, at 9–11; BANNON, supra note 32, at 11. 
 173.  PACC, supra note 7, at 598 (remarks of Del. Davis). 
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IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO MAINTAIN JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN ALASKA’S MERIT SYSTEM 
Alaska’s judicial merit system is strong, but it is still vulnerable. This 
Part examines potential reforms to preserve the independence of Alaska’s 
judiciary. As Justice O’Connor stated, “even states that use a merit-
selection system to select judges should scrutinize their plans to preserve 
what is essential to judicial independence and reform those aspects of the 
plan that are expendable and might otherwise endanger the whole.”174 
Proposed reforms fall into two broad categories: changes to reinforce the 
existing system, and manners of replacing the existing system. While the 
decision ultimately falls to the people of Alaska, the most effective 
solution is the last one offered: replacing the judicial retention mechanism 
with a system similar to the current appointment process. 
A. Changes to Reinforce the Existing System 
Short of completely doing away with the current retention system, 
there are a number of reforms that could help reduce the threat to the 
independence of Alaska’s judiciary. These fixes to the existing system 
may sit better with Alaskan policy makers and the Alaskan public given 
that both groups are broadly content with the system as it was originally 
designed.175 This section reviews solutions that do not involve removing 
judicial retention elections. 
1.  Campaign Finance Reform 
Given the impact of Citizens United,176 campaign finance reform 
would be an important first step to reforming the current system. One 
possibility could involve a prohibition on fundraising in these elections 
except in extraordinary situations.177 This potential solution is reinforced 
by the impact that raising money has on judicial decisions.178 However, 
this solution is fraught with potential risks. First, while it has been 
suggested as a potential reform,179 it does not appear that any state has 
 
 174.  O’Connor, supra note 104, at 481. While Justice O’Connor was speaking 
about the original Missouri Plan, her comments are equally applicable to Alaska’s 
judicial merit system given that it was based on the Missouri Plan. Id.; PACC, 
supra note 7, at 584 (remarks of Del. McLaughlin). 
 175.  Boyer, supra note 77, at 625. 
 176.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 10. 
 177.  O’CONNOR JUDICIAL SELECTION PLAN, supra note 76, at 8. 
 178.  See BANNON, supra note 32, at 4 (explaining that a correlation exists 
between donations and judges’ decisions when they still have a future reelection 
campaign). 
 179.  O’CONNOR JUDICIAL SELECTION PLAN, supra note 76, at 8. 
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actually completely banned judicial fundraising by all potential people or 
groups in judicial elections. Second, it is not clear whether such a ban 
would be constitutional. In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,180 the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized that judicial elections can be regulated in 
different ways because of the different roles judges play in contrast to 
politicians.181 While the Supreme Court ruled that a state could prohibit 
judges from personally soliciting donations,182 it did not address a total 
ban on solicitation.183 Thus, a complete ban on judicial fundraising may 
not last. Finally, this solution could ultimately do more harm than good 
by exacerbating the difficulty judges have in responding to attacks. This 
potential harm is only heightened by the fact that judicial opponents may 
not need money to attack judges; the successful ouster of Judge Corey was 
“a popular uprising.”184 
Another campaign finance solution is to enact a public financing 
system, which a number of scholars and public interest groups have 
recommended,185 because it can help ensure the appearance of 
impartiality by limiting the role of special interest money.186 With public 
financing, candidates who receive a certain amount of public support 
could opt in to a system that would provide all or a majority of their 
campaign funds from a variety of public sources.187 The goal of these 
systems is to ensure that all candidates have the ability to campaign if 
need be, but do not have to waste time fundraising nor accept funds from 
individuals who may then appear before them.188 
However, public financing does not seem to address problems 
specifically occurring in Alaska. As an initial point, it is typically only a 
solution in states with competitive elections.189 Furthermore, it can be 
very difficult to find funding for such a program.190 The lack of funding 
is likely especially an issue in Alaska given the state’s recent budget 
 
 180.  575 U.S. 433 (2015). 
 181.  Id. at 446. 
 182.  Id. at 455. 
 183.  See id. at 452 (chastising the dissent for saying Florida had to ban all 
fundraising in the case before simply saying that the state did not have to make 
an all-or-nothing decision on that front). 
 184.  Boots, supra note 4. 
 185.  Dann & Hansen, supra note 124, at 1440; BANNON, supra note 32, at 5; AM. 
BAR ASS’N, supra note 55, at 14. 
 186.  AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 105, at 1; BANNON, supra note 32, 
at 13. 
 187.  See generally DEBORAH GOLDBERG, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, PUBLIC 
FUNDING OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: FINANCING CAMPAIGNS FOR FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 
COURTS (2002) (detailing possible systems of public financing for elections). 
 188.  Id. at 3–4. 
 189.  SARA MATHIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION 
REFORMS 45 (1990). 
 190.  Id. at 46. 
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crises.191 Finally, public financing is generally unpopular with the 
public.192 
2. Means of Defending Judges from Attacks 
Solutions that maintain retention elections could also focus on 
defending judges from politicized attacks.193 Alaska already made one 
change in this vein in 1976, when it instituted judicial evaluations to 
overcome the lack of information voters had about judicial retention 
candidates.194 Such evaluations also help to counter biased or politically-
motivated “performance reviews” by interest groups.195 They further 
mitigate the need for fundraising, especially when they are disseminated 
by the government, as they are in Alaska.196 There are a number of 
additional options that fall within the same spirit as the Judicial Council’s 
evaluations. 
One solution in this category would be to have the Judicial Council 
put out proactive ads for judges they have recommended retaining, in a 
similar vein to the reactive ad for Judge Tan in 2012.197 This tact would 
solve several potential problems. First, it would lessen the impact of last-
minute surprise attack ads as voters would have already been exposed to 
the ads in support of the judge. Second, it would reduce the need for 
judges to raise money and campaign because they would get a baseline 
boost from Judicial Council advertisements. Third, it would help judges 
like Judge Corey who were recommended for retention but who did not 
have people to help build up their campaign as Justices Bolger and 
Maassen did.198 However, this potential solution has similar weaknesses 
to public financing because it would involve public tax money for the 
Judicial Council funding for the ads. While a few thousand dollars per 
candidate does not seem like a significant expenditure,199 the public may 
 
 191.  E.g., James Brooks, Alaska Legislators Expect ‘Colossal’ Supplemental 
Spending, Gobbling Last Year’s Budget Cuts, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Jan. 30, 2020) 
[hereinafter Brooks, Alaska Legislators], https://www.adn.com/politics/alaska-
legislature/2020/01/31/alaska-legislators-expect-colossal-supplemental-
spending-gobbling-last-years-budget-cuts/. 
 192.  MATHIAS, supra note 189, at 46. 
 193.  See Dann & Hansen, supra note 124, at 1440 (explaining that judges in 
retention elections must be able to make adequate responses to the charges against 
them). 
 194.  Andersen, supra note 55, at 1375; BANNON, supra note 32, at 5; AM. BAR 
ASS’N, supra note 55, at 9. 
 195.  Andersen, supra note 55, at 1378. 
 196.  Id. at 1379; ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.58.010, .020, .030(g), .050 (2020). 
 197.  Feidt, supra note 4. 
 198.  Compare the level of support from the legal community in Boots, supra 
note 4, with that in Kitchenman, supra note 5. 
 199.  See Feidt, supra note 4 (explaining how much the Judicial Council spent 
on ads for Judge Tan). 
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not have the budget appetite given the intense spending cuts of 2019 and 
difficulties in the 2020 budgeting process.200 
Another option would be to amend the Alaska Judicial Code of 
Conduct to allow judges to respond more comprehensively to attacks 
against them.201 After one of Tennessee’s supreme court justices was not 
retained in 1996 for her death penalty decisions, the state did just that and 
allowed judges to respond freely to substantive criticisms and distortions 
of their records.202 Alaska could amend its Judicial Code of Conduct to 
include a similar provision. However, this potential solution has two 
drawbacks. The solution could be worse than the ill it seeks to cure, 
because the broader leeway given to judges could politicize the retention 
races even more.203 Further, the solution does not appear well-suited to 
Alaska. Alaska’s judges have a deep-seated belief in not publicizing their 
views on contentious issues that may appear before their courts.204 
A final potential solution would involve imposing filing deadlines 
for people seeking to oppose the retention of judges.205 Not requiring 
opponents to declare their opposition by a set date incentivizes strategic 
blitz attacks on judges.206 These types of attacks are already an issue in 
Alaska, especially as part of a coordinated campaign.207 In fact, that very 
issue arose in Justice Fabe’s 2010 retention election when the active 
opposition kicked off its campaign mere days before the election.208 
Currently, judges must declare their intent to seek retention by August 
1,209 and the Judicial Council recommendations are generally finished by 
the second half of September.210 As a result, the deadline for declaring 
opposition could plausibly be October 1. This would give potential 
opponents sufficient time to consider whether they plan to declare active 
 
 200.  Brooks, Alaska Legislators, supra note 191. 
 201.  MATHIAS, supra note 189, at 29. 
 202.  Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 
73–74 (1999). 
 203.  See MATHIAS, supra note 189, at 29 (noting the potential dangers of 
broadening judicial ethics canons). 
 204.  See Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 
843 (9th Cir. 2007) (where judges simply did not respond substantively to a survey 
asking them their views on issues from assisted suicide to abortion). 
 205.  See Dann & Hansen, supra note 124, at 1441 (proposing a filing deadline 
for retention opposition in general). 
 206.  Reid, supra note 202, at 76. 
 207.  Kalytiak, supra note 65; see Klumpp, supra note 2, at 145 (citing Justice 
Carpeneti from the CLE explaining his concern about coordinated campaigns 
against judges). 
 208.  Kalytiak, supra note 65. 
 209.  ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.35.040, .055, .070, .110 (2020). 
 210.  See Rivera, Preliminary Numbers, supra note 1 (stating the Judicial Council 
had completed its recommendations before Judge Corey’s plea decision); Boots, 
supra note 1 (stating the plea decision came on September 22). 
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opposition and give those judges facing opposition enough time to 
organize their response. 
This potential solution has possible First Amendment issues and 
could be difficult to enforce, given the broad definition of active 
opposition.211 In order for this solution to be possible, it will likely require 
the legislature to go back and narrow what conduct would fall within the 
scope of that term. Still, especially in the context of coordinated anti-
retention campaigns such as the one faced by Justice Fabe, this solution 
could provide benefits and avoid the enforcement difficulties involved 
with less organized opposition such as a series of social media posts by 
loosely affiliated individuals. However, a detailed discussion of these 
possible First Amendment issues and solutions is beyond the scope of this 
Note and the expertise of this author. 
3. Increasing Voter Education and Information 
The last potential solution that maintains judicial retention elections 
focuses on increasing the amount and efficacy of information voters 
receive. This solution would involve updating Alaska’s pre-existing state 
government civic education curriculum for secondary school students. 
The new curriculum could include a section on the importance of the 
judiciary following the rule of law and protecting the rights of the 
unpopular. It could also contain a discussion of the role of retention 
elections in Alaska’s judicial merit system and how they are not meant as 
a means of throwing out judges for decisions with which a person 
disagrees. Reforming civics education is a common recommendation for 
improving judicial elections in general.212 It is also recommended in other 
states where the public is skeptical of judicial retention processes that aim 
to foster judicial independence.213 If done properly, such civics education 
can help develop a consensus of restraint around non-retention of 
judges.214 
Further, this potential solution may be particularly fitting for Alaska. 
For one, it could help address the longstanding skepticism that Alaskans 
have towards the legal system.215 Second, the Judicial Council already 
 
 211.  ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 5C(2) Commentary (1998). 
 212.  AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 105, at 4; O’Connor, supra note 
104, at 492–93. 
 213.  AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
HAWAII 1, 3, 5–6 (2008), http://americanjudicaturesociety.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/ATTACHMENT-9.pdf. 
 214.  See Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge’s 
Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1983 
(1988) (urging professionals in a position to influence the public to lobby the 
public towards constraint in judicial elections). 
 215.  Klumpp, supra note 2, at 159. 
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undertakes civics-style education through official statements. As an 
example, the Judicial Council’s official online Frequently Asked 
Questions section explains: “You do a public service to your fellow 
citizens by voting to retain judges who perform well and voting not to 
retain a judge who does not meet expectations.”216 Similarly, the Judicial 
Council’s executive director is often quoted explaining how voters should 
look at judges’ entire body of work rather than just a single decision.217 
This solution does involve two potential drawbacks. One, the overall 
effectiveness of such a civic education campaign is unclear. Second, even 
if it is effective, it is not clear how soon civics education would impact the 
judicial retention elections; it is possible that the state cannot afford to 
wait. 
B. Removing Judicial Retention Elections 
While reforms to the current system may be the more politically 
expedient solution, they will likely be insufficient to fully counteract the 
rising threat to judicial independence in Alaska. Although the system is, 
for the time being, largely still functioning as it was intended, the current 
trend in the politicization of retention elections indicates that it is unlikely 
to continue doing so. Some public interest groups have recommended 
ending retention elections altogether.218 This is partially premised on 
refuting the false choice between accountability with elections and 
independence without elections.219 Instead, it emphasizes that states have 
accountability safeguards other than retention elections.220 After 
 
 216.  ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 56. The same FAQ warns against 
politicizing the retention process: 
Sometimes judges are asked to resolve contentious or divisive 
disputes involving social issues. As in all cases, a judge must do 
his or her best to fairly and impartially apply the law, even if it 
requires the judge to issue a decision that is unpopular, or 
which conflicts with the judge’s personal beliefs. . . . [E]fforts [to 
unseat a judge for political or ideological reasons] may be 
aimed at affecting future decisions of other judges. [E]fforts to 
unseat a judge [for political reasons] diminish the neutrality 
and impartiality of our judiciary. 
Id. 
 217.  E.g., Matt Miller, Why Alaska Judges Don’t Raise Campaign Funds to Continue 
to Serve, Like Other States’, ALASKA PUB. MED. (Nov. 7, 2016), 
https://www.alaskapublic.org/2016/11/07/why-alaska-judges-dont-raise-
campaign-funds-to-continue-to-serve-like-other-states/. 
 218.  See, e.g., BANNON, supra note 32, at 10 (“Even as part of a merit selection 
system, we recommend against judicial retention elections.”). 
 219.  See O’Connor, supra note 104, at 483 (characterizing the “choice between 
an independent and an accountable judiciary” as “false”). 
 220.  See BANNON, supra note 32, at 10 (listing safeguards other than retention 
elections). 
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discussing the other safeguards Alaska will still have if it eliminates 
judicial retention elections, this Section will discuss the options for 
replacing such elections. First, it will discuss the possibility of a long 
single term for judges and explain why that solution may not fit with 
Alaska. Then, it will turn to considering a replacement for the current 
retention mechanism, ultimately arguing that making the current 
retention recommendations binding best balances the needs of judicial 
independence and accountability. 
1. Continued Judicial Accountability Safeguards with a New Retention 
Mechanism 
While elections are one form of accountability, other means exist to 
protect that value even if Alaska enacts these alternatives to retention 
elections. One such safeguard is the nomination process itself.221 Given 
the strong reputation of Alaska’s judges and the high rate of retention 
throughout the system’s history, it is clear that the initial nomination 
process is producing judicial candidates worthy of their position.222 
Further, the public already has significant input in the nominating 
process, including via their election of the governor, so the loss of one 
democratic check is minimized.223 
A number of safeguards beyond retention elections also exist once 
judges are on the bench. As with any judiciary, statutory and 
constitutional limits constrain judicial discretion.224 Both trial judges and 
lower-level appellate judges are subject to the appellate review process. 
In Alaska specifically, the Commission on Judicial Conduct can also 
recommend sanctions, including suspension or removal, for the Alaska 
Supreme Court to apply.225 Finally, judges can be impeached for 
malfeasance or misfeasance.226 Given these safeguards, Alaska could end 
judicial retention elections without sacrificing significant accountability 
 
 221.  Grodin, supra note 214, at 1983; BANNON, supra note 32, at 10. 
 222.  See Carpeneti & Frazer, supra note 10, at 233; see Carns & Dosik, supra note 
6, at 202 (explaining that only five judges were not retained before Judge Corey 
was not retained). 
 223.  Carns & Dosik, supra note 6, at 198; Carpeneti & Frazer, supra note 10, at 
207. 
 224.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 5; see AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 213, at 1 
(describing other safeguards in Hawaii’s system, which uses the equivalent of 
judicial council recommendation for retention). 
 225.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 10 (“In addition to being subject to impeachment 
under Section 12 of this article, a justice or judge may be disqualified from acting 
as such and may be suspended, removed from office, retired, or censured by the 
supreme court upon the recommendation of the commission. The powers and 
duties of the commission and the bases for judicial disqualification shall be 
established by law.”). 
 226.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 12. 
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within the system. 
Recognizing the potentially significant nature of this change, a 
possible way to mitigate risks from such a shift could be to make changes 
to the non-constitutional, statutory courts first.227 Only the Alaska 
Supreme Court and superior courts are created by the Constitution.228 The 
court of appeals and district courts are both created by statute.229 Thus, to 
change the retention mechanism for the Supreme and superior courts 
requires using the constitutional amendment process, requiring a two-
thirds vote by each house of the legislature and then a majority vote by 
the public in favor of the amendment.230 By contrast, the court of appeals 
and district courts can have their retention mechanism changed by a 
majority vote in each house.231 
Due to the greater difficulty of changing the retention process for the 
Supreme Court and superior courts, any change in the retention 
mechanism could be first made to the court of appeals and district courts. 
Especially given that the district courts have retention elections every four 
years,232 this would allow the state to judge the new retention process. 
Assuming the new system works, these positive experiences with the 
court of appeals and district courts would provide greater incentive and 
support to push for a constitutional amendment to change the process for 
the Supreme Court and superior courts. If the system did not work or if 
the people of Alaska decided they still preferred the old system of 
retention elections, they could revert to the old system with legislation 
alone because the constitutionally created courts would not have been 
changed yet. The difference between statutory and constitutional courts 
could be leveraged to test the new retention mechanism in a way that is 
easier to implement and then easier to change back if necessary. The 
question then becomes how to determine judicial terms in the absence of 
retention elections. 
 2. Single Terms 
The first potential option is to have all judges serve a single term. 
Judges could have lifetime tenure during good behavior, similar to the 
federal judiciary.233 However, life tenure is likely to face stiff pushback 
 
 227.  Since the court of appeals and district courts are controlled by statute, 
they can be changed through normal legislation rather than by constitutional 
amendment. ALASKA CONST. art. IV §§ 2–3; ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.010 (2020). 
 228.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 2–3. 
 229.  ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 22.07.010, .15.010 (2020). 
 230.  ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 1. 
 231.  See ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 14 (requiring majority support in each house 
for a bill to become law). 
 232.  ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.15.030(10) (2020). 
 233.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 11. 
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given that Alaska’s Framers explicitly rejected it out of concerns that 
judges would be completely unresponsive to the will of the people and 
would not change with the times.234 
Alternatively, judges could serve a single, lengthy term such that 
they are on the bench for a set period of time but free from the influence 
of potential future elections.235 Many recommendations in this vein set the 
term between fourteen and eighteen years with staggered terms on multi-
member courts.236 U.S. Supreme Court Justices believe it can take years to 
fully understand the job, and this system has the benefit of allowing for 
that learning.237 The job security of the position also helps to attract high 
quality applicants.238 Further, this method ensures the bench reflects 
evolving community values by creating consistent turnover.239 
However, as with some prior potential solutions, this does not seem 
to be particular fitting for Alaska. First, Alaska’s current system already 
has high quality judges, so the supposed added benefits of this system of 
attracting higher quality judges would be minimal to non-existent.240 
Second, some of the other benefits, such as lowering the stakes of a 
vacancy, do not really make sense in light of the insulation from political 
stakes that the selection process already engenders.241 Finally, this change 
would potentially force judges off the bench while they still could 
admirably continue to serve the people of Alaska. Alaska has had a 
number of high-quality, long-serving jurists.242 As already noted, it can 
take judges years to completely learn the job, and this solution would 
continuously remove experienced and competent judges.243 
 3. Replacing the Retention Mechanism 
To avoid a situation where competent judges are removed due to an 
arbitrary term limit, Alaska could implement a hybrid retention system. 
 
 234.  See PACC, supra note 7, at 598 (remarks of Del. Davis) (“Any attorney who 
has practiced law has seen instances where a judge appointed for a lifetime, after 
serving for a length of time, becomes completely unresponsive to the will of the 
people, refuses to change with the times and the times do change.”). 
 235.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 1; Grodin, supra note 214, at 1983. 
 236.  E.g. BANNON, supra note 32, at 11, 15. 
 237.  Id. at 12. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Carpeneti & Frazer, supra note 10, at 233. 
 241.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 12; see PACC, supra note 7, at 599 (remarks of 
Del. Davis) (describing how, unlike where judges are appointed for short terms, 
the Alaska system would “keep judges free from outside pressures.”). 
 242.  See generally, e.g., Susan Orlansky & Jeffrey M. Feldman, Justice Rabinowitz 
and Personal Freedom: Evolving a Constitutional Framework, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 1 
(1998) (praising Chief Justice Rabinowitz’s seminal decisions protecting 
individual constitutional rights in Alaska over decades). 
 243.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 12. 
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Rather than putting judicial retention to the electorate, an independent 
body such as the Judicial Council could make the final decision on 
retention.244 While this proposed solution would remove an opportunity 
for public participation via voting, the current system for appointments 
through the Judicial Council already includes significant public input and 
relies on many of the other safeguards within the system.245 This solution 
is the best way to balance the competing interests of judicial 
accountability and independence. It increases judicial independence by 
removing the growing threat of the politicization of retention elections. It 
maintains accountability in the system because it provides a way other 
than elections to remove poorly performing judges.246 Ultimately, this 
solution is best suited to provide the proper balance between 
accountability and independence. 
Switching to a complete reliance on the Judicial Council’s 
recommendations is feasible because both judges and voters in Alaska 
broadly believe the current recommendation system is working well. In 
surveys, 66.7% of judges in Alaska agree or strongly agree that the overall 
process to collect information for the recommendations is fair.247 Only 
22.9% of judges think that the Judicial Council’s evaluations undermine 
their independence.248 Given this low number, the threat to independence 
from the Judicial Council is likely lower than the threat posed by 
increasingly contentious retention elections. Further, voters broadly 
follow the recommendations of the Judicial Council. Voters have only 
acted counter to the Judicial Council’s recommendation four times in 
Alaska’s history since 1982.249 A study looking at every retention election 
 
 244.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 2, 11; ALASKA STAT. § 15.58.020 (2020). 
 245.  ALASKA COURT SYS., supra note 33; ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 
56. 
 246.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 12. 
 247.  Andersen, supra note 55, at 1387. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  One is obviously Judge Corey. Rivera, Preliminary Numbers, supra note 1. 
In addition, voters have retained three of seven judges whom the Judicial Council 
had recommended against retaining between 1982 and 2014. Fortson & Knudsen, 
supra note 125, at 9. Between 1976—when the Judicial Council first started making 
recommendations—and 1982, the Judicial Council recommended against 
retention multiple times, but the judges were all retained. TERESA WHITE CARNS, 
LARRY COHN & SUSAN MCKELVIE, SELECTION AND EVALUATING ALASKA’S JUDGES: 
1984–2012 43 n.85 (2013), 
https://ajc.alaska.gov/publications/docs/research/SelectingEvaluatingAKJud
ges1984-2012%20(July%202013).pdf. These breaks with the Judicial Council’s 
recommendations could reflect the relative novelty of the recommendation 
procedure to both the Council and voters. The Judicial Council itself even 
suggested that possibility in a report to Alaska’s Legislature and Supreme Court. 
See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SIXTEENTH REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE AND SUPREME 
COURT: 1991–1992 F-5–6 (1993), 
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in Alaska between 1976 and 1996 found a positive correlation between 
ratings and retention votes.250 The study also found that voters were even 
more persuaded by negative recommendations than by positive ones.251 
All of this suggests that either voters trust the Judicial Council or find its 
recommendation persuasive enough to follow—even if that is due to the 
Judicial Council’s informational advantages.252 Thus, it is likely that 
voters would broadly trust a system in which the Judicial Council’s 
recommendations became a binding decision on whether or not to retain 
a judge. 
Hawaii already uses this system, so it is possible to look at its 
experience for insight about this change as well.253 In many ways, it makes 
sense that Hawaii has a very similar system. Like Alaska, it was one of the 
last states to be admitted to the Union, so it could also draw on 
experiences of all the other states.254 The comparison is also a fitting one 
for other reasons. First, Alaska’s Framers looked to Hawaii as a good 
source on independence in the judiciary.255 Second, Hawaii’s process for 
deciding whether to retain judges is very similar to the Judicial Council’s 
process to decide whether to recommend retention, which this solution 
 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/141097NCJRS.pdf (explaining 
the differences between the 1982 election and earlier elections “included 
increasing reliance on Judicial Council recommendations as voters grew more 
familiar with them”). That possibility is bolstered by the fact that the Judicial 
Council updated over time its methods for evaluating judges when making 
retention recommendations. See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 30, at 76, 80–81 
(detailing changes in the Judicial Council’s information gathering for retention 
recommendations). Furthermore, the Judicial Council itself has not evaluated 
retention elections before 1984 in its official publications. See Alaska Judicial 
Council, PUBLICATIONS (last visited Aug. 19, 2020), 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/publications/index.html#research (including only 
reports on retention elections that start with 1984 at the earliest). Finally, the 
judges ranked as unqualified in pre-1982 elections either resigned or were 
defeated after a second recommendation against retention. Brian S. Akre, Alaska 
Voters Consider Fate of ’Unqualified’ Judge, AP (Nov. 5, 1988), 
https://apnews.com/16c33988fb33447c26799d12ff57b934. The year 1982 thus 
represents a reasonable starting point, and this Note will only examine in depth 
times when voters contravened the Judicial Council’s recommendation starting in 
1982. 
 250.  ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 30, at 70. Because this study covers the 
years 1976 to 1982, it also accounts for the times when voters acted counter to the 
Council’s recommendations in those elections. Id. 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 125, at 9; ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 
30, at 70. 
 253.  BANNON, supra note 32, at 2. 
 254.  Boyer, supra note 77, at 609. 
 255.  See PACC, supra note 7, at 596 (remarks of Del. V. Rivers) (citing the 
Hawaiian Legislative Handbook when discussing judicial independence). 
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would use as the new retention mechanism.256 Overall, Hawaii’s system 
has been working well with the main issue being a greater need for 
improved civics education to help the public better understand how it 
operates257—an issue Alaska must also confront.258 Thus, Hawaii provides 
further evidence that Alaska would fare well switching to a system in 
which the Judicial Council controlled retention through its current 
recommendation process. 
The switch to retention solely via the Judicial Council does have 
potential drawbacks. First, this system would increase the influence of the 
Judicial Council. Opponents of the current system have already indicated 
they believe lawyers have too much influence in the process.259 However, 
the Alaskan legislature has repeatedly rejected attempts to diminish the 
power of lawyers within the Judicial Council.260 Legally-trained members 
of the Judicial Council are prioritized in the initial nomination process 
because they have more familiarity with the subject matter and potential 
judges.261 That familiarity carries over to the retention recommendation 
as well.262 Finally, just as with the initial nomination process, the three lay 
members of the Judicial Council provide balance.263 Therefore, concerns 
about outsized influence for attorneys under such a system are 
unfounded. While it is possible the Judicial Council as a whole could 
become out of touch with the people of Alaska, that issue could be 
corrected by the Bar and the governor when the six-year terms of the 
Council members are up.264 Further, the arguments against the Judicial 
Council have never expressed a concern that the whole Council, rather 
than just the attorneys, was out of touch with the people of Alaska. 
But what about the four times that the voters have gone against the 
Judicial Council since 1982?265 Judge Corey is an easy case because his 
non-retention was the very catalyst for exploring this change given the 
damage to judicial independence it could have.266 However, the three 
judges who voters retained, despite negative recommendations, are more 
difficult. Still, upon closer examination, the non-retention of those judges 
 
 256.  Compare AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 213, at 9–11, with ALASKA 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 56. 
 257.  AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 213, at 12. 
 258.  See supra Part IIIA3. 
 259.  Carpeneti & Frazer, supra note 10, at 226. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Boyer, supra note 77, at 618. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8. 
 265.  For an explanation of why this Note only looks at breaks with the Judicial 
Council’s recommendation since 1982 see supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 266.  See supra Part IIB. 
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would have been acceptable and even better despite going against the 
public sentiment. Two of the three had already committed judicial 
misconduct leading to the no-retention recommendation, two of the three 
would commit judicial misconduct after being retained, and two of the 
three were retained due to campaigns that, at least in part, politicized the 
judiciary. 
The first judge that was retained despite negative recommendations, 
Judge Karl Johnstone in 1988, was only retained after a politically-charged 
group pushed for his retention.267 The Judicial Council recommended 
against retaining Johnstone because he “scored poorly in integrity, 
judicial temperament, and overall performance” as ranked by fellow 
lawyers and judges.268 While some people were concerned that the 
surveys of Johnstone could have been skewed by attorneys seeking 
revenge, that criticism is undercut by the fact that over five hundred 
lawyers and judges were surveyed, making it doubtful that revenge 
motivated a significant portion of the group.269 Furthermore, to the extent 
such concern about potential bias by losing parties was valid, the Judicial 
Council has since expanded the basis for input to include the public writ 
large. This expansion makes it extremely unlikely that a disgruntled 
minority could bias the recommendation process now.270 Finally, the 
Judicial Council was later vindicated in its concern that Johnstone did not 
have the necessary integrity to be a judge; twelve years after the Council 
recommended against retaining him, Johnstone was publicly 
reprimanded by the Alaska Supreme Court for creating the appearance 
of impropriety by hiring the coroner in his judicial district.271 
Johnstone was ultimately retained following a campaign led by a 
victims’ rights group, which Johnstone highlighted in arguing for his own 
retention.272 The victims’ rights movement represents the same marriage 
 
 267.  See Sheila Toomey, Election 1988 Voters Lean Toward Retaining All 17 Judges 
Despite Disputes, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 9, 1988, at D1 [hereinafter 
Toomey, Election 1988 Voters], infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-
view?p=AMNEWS&docref=news/0F78DD5B6A9692E4 (“To counter the 
council’s recommendation against his retention, Johnstone’s supporters, which 
include a local victims’ rights group, mounted a lowkeyed campaign of letters to 
the editor, a few newspaper ads last week and at least one mailing, all of which 
praised him as fair and firm and recommended he be kept on the bench.”). 
 268.  Akre, supra note 249. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 30, at 76, 80 (describing measures 
the Judicial Council took to increase public input in the 1990s). 
 271.  In re Johnstone, 2 P.3d 1226, 1228, 1238 (Alaska 2000) (upholding the 
Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct’s public reprimand and then stating the 
opinion would count as the public reprimand). 
 272.  Toomey, Election 1988, supra note 267; Sheila Toomey, Election 1988 Judge’s 
Integrity Comes Under Question As Election Issue, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30, 
1988, at K1, infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-
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of right and left that succeeded in motivating Judge Corey’s ouster thirty 
years after Johnstone’s.273 The judicial merit system is designed to insulate 
judges from such political influence, so the fact that Johnstone’s retention 
would have been avoided through a system solely based on the Judicial 
Council’s recommendations is a boon rather than a drawback. Thus, 
Johnstone’s retention against the recommendation of the Judicial Council 
is further reason to support changing to a system in which the Council’s 
recommendation becomes a binding decision on whether or not to retain 
a judge. 
The second judge retained despite a negative recommendation, 
Judge Dennis Cummings whose negative recommendation occurred in 
2008, was removed from the bench in 2013 by the Alaska Supreme Court 
for a similar misconduct issue that led to the Judicial Council’s initial 
recommendation against his retention.274 The Judicial Council 
recommended against retaining Cummings for improper ex parte 
communication and low ratings from fellow jurists on legal ability and 
temperament.275 It is not clear why voters chose to retain him because 
there were no reports of pro-retention efforts. Nevertheless, the Alaska 
Supreme Court’s decision to uphold a recommendation of removal from 
office for the same issue flagged by the Judicial Council vindicates the 
Judicial Council’s recommendation of non-retention for Cummings.276 
Under a system in which the Judicial Council’s recommendation was 
binding, the Commission on Judicial Conduct and the Alaska Supreme 
Court would have not had to use additional resources to remove 
Cummings from office for misconduct similar to that which concerned 
the Judicial Council. The Cummings example only provides further 
reason to support a change to a system in which the Council’s 
recommendation is binding. 
 
view?p=AMNEWS&docref=news/0F78DD64E4DC3ED6. 
 273.  See Jill Lepore, The Rise of the Victims’-Rights Movement, THE NEW YORKER 
(May 14, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/the-rise-
of-the-victims-rights-movement (recounting the influence of both the right-wing 
tough on crime movement and the liberal feminist movement in the rise of the 
modern victims’ rights movement). 
 274.  See Lisa Demer, Bethel Judge Defends Himself Against Misconduct Charge, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 17, 2008), https://www.adn.com/alaska-
news/article/bethel-judge-defends-himself-against-misconduct-
charge/2008/11/18/ (detailing Cummings’s retention despite a no-retention 
recommendation based on an ethics complaint for improper ex parte 
communication); In re Cummings, 292 P.3d 187, 191 (Alaska 2013) (explaining that 
Cummings was removed from judicial office for improper ex parte 
communication in part because it was a second offense). 
 275.  ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 2008 JUDICIAL RETENTION PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION MATERIALS JUDGE DENNIS P. CUMMINGS BETHEL DISTRICT COURT 2 
(2008), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/retent08/cummings08.pdf. 
 276.  Cummings, 292 P.3d at 191. 
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The final case in which voters retained a judge given a non-retention 
recommendation from the Judicial Council, Judge William Estelle in 2014, 
involved a pro-retention campaign supported in part by a small group 
who oppose the Judicial Council in general.277 The Judicial Council 
recommended against retaining Estelle because he filed sixteen false 
affidavits incorrectly certifying he completed matters pending before him 
in the statutorily-allotted time.278 For that transgression, the Commission 
on Judicial Conduct suspended Estelle for 45 days, after finding his error 
was reckless but unintentional, and the Alaska Supreme Court upheld 
that punishment.279 As an initial matter, the Judicial Council performed 
its task and decided to recommend against retention because Estelle had, 
albeit unintentionally, committed an act that called his integrity into 
question not once but sixteen times. Such a lack of integrity can certainly 
disqualify a judge in a merit-based system, especially considering all 
judges and even attorneys know about the rule that judges must follow 
to truthfully sign such affidavits.280 
Further, while many people supported Estelle because they had 
known him their whole lives and thought he had integrity,281 some 
support came from those who believed the Judicial Council was 
“worthless” and “incompetent”282 or who believed that the Judicial 
Council was merely “politicking” and that a “Legislative wing-clipping” 
of the Council’s advertising budget had failed to accomplish its goal.283 
Much of this resistance to the recommendation was based not on Estelle’s 
merit but on a critique of the system generally. As with the previous 
examples, the Judicial Council’s no-retention recommendation for Estelle 
was justified by judicial misconduct, and the campaign for retention was, 
 
 277.  James Brooks, Meet the Judges on the Ballot in Southeast Alaska, JUNEAU 
EMPIRE (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.juneauempire.com/news/meet-the-
judges-on-the-ballot-in-southeast-alaska/; see Stuart Thompson, Judge Estelle is 
Being Used as a Scapegoat, MAT-SU VALLEY FRONTIERSMAN, June 16, 2014, at Section 
16, infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-
view?p=AMNEWS&docref=news/14E81207EB59D6E0 (declaring the non-
retention recommendation “is glaring and gross proof that [the Judicial Council’s] 
recommendations are worthless, and that its members are arguably incompetent 
at executing their constitutional duties”). 
 278.  Lockyer, supra note 9. 
 279.  In re Estelle, 336 P.3d 692, 693, 696–97 (Alaska 2014). 
 280.  Id. at 697. 
 281.  E.g., Supports Estelle, MAT-SU VALLEY FRONTIERSMAN, Oct. 30, 2014, at 
Opinions Section, infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-
view?p=AMNEWS&docref=news/1515395B5BEA5CC0. 
 282.  Thompson, supra note 277. 
 283.  Lynne Gallant, DiPietro Omits Positive Information about Judge Estelle, MAT-
SU VALLEY FRONTIERSMAN, Nov. 1, 2014, at Opinions Section, 
infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-
view?p=AMNEWS&docref=news/15158920E0D37910. 
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in part, based on political backlash that threatened to undermine judicial 
independence. 
Reviewing the three times since 1982 that voters have contradicted 
the Judicial Council, none represent situations that should be emulated. 
All three times, the judges either were ranked poorly in judicial qualities 
or had been accused of misconduct, the very qualities the judicial merit 
system is designed to exclude. Additionally, for the two pro-retention 
campaigns on which information was available, some of the push to 
retain the judges was motivated by social or political movements, which 
again runs counter to the design of the judicial merit system by 
undermining judicial independence. If retentions motivated by factors 
other than the quality of the judge in question are the main loss of 
switching to a system in which the Judicial Council or another similar 
independent body makes retention decisions, then the change would be 
a positive one. 
Additionally, this new retention mechanism maintains public input 
while increasing independence. In order to protect against continued 
threats to the independence of Alaska’s judiciary, the state would be well-
served by switching to this updated retention mechanism. As stated 
before, such a change could first be tested in the non-constitutional courts 
(the district courts and court of appeals). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Sixty-five years ago, at Alaska’s constitutional convention, the 
Framers of Alaska designed a judicial merit system to select and retain 
competent judges in a way that maintained judicial independence while 
still preserving a degree of accountability. Subsequent history has shown 
that Alaska has one of the best systems in the country. However, as 
judicial elections, including retention elections, become increasingly 
vulnerable to politicization that undermines judicial independence 
around the country, Alaska has seen signs that its system may be 
vulnerable to those same corrupting influences. Given that Alaska 
already has a lower baseline median approval rating for judges in 
retention elections, its judges are more vulnerable to non-retention and 
could be easier targets for the type of targeted voting that undermines 
judicial independence.284 Maintaining independence is a good thing for 
rule of law, and more independence in selection and retention can actually 
increase the policy congruence of judges and the average citizen.285 
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The increasing politicization of the judiciary is a threat to the ideals 
set forth by the Framers. Alaska must respond proactively to preserve this 
balance for generations to come. The solutions proposed in this Note seek 
to protect judicial independence while still maintaining accountability in 
the system. Campaign finance reform for retention elections, expanding 
the means of defending judges from attacks, and greater voter education 
could help while still preserving judicial retention elections. However, a 
new retention mechanism is still the best way to both protect 
independence and maintain accountability. The last solution—relying on 
the Judicial Council alone as a retention mechanism—best balances the 
dual goals of judicial independence and accountability. Still, the choice 
among these potential solutions must ultimately be made by the people 
of Alaska and the legal community that serves them. 
 
